How 37 Asian, African and Latin American nations fought back against US and UK imperialism

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Image Courtesy: India Today

By ND Jayaprakash

Organized opposition to colonialism and imperialism began in the late 1920s, and Indian leaders, especially Jawaharlal Nehru, made significant contributions via the Non-Aligned Movement.

The Belgrade Declaration, adopted at the first NAM Conference on 6 September 1961 and the McCloy-Zorin Accords on General and Complete Disarmament signed between the United States and the USSR in New York on 20 September 1961, have much in common. Inputs from the Belgrade Declaration greatly influenced the final version of the McCloy-Zorin Accords, a very powerful joint statement. Unfortunately, the likely adverse impact that the implementation of the Agreed Principles would have had on the fortunes of the military-industrial complex provoked strong counter-reactions from the powers that be. As a result, over the last sixty years, instead of initiating action as per the Agreed Principles, the establishment within the United States and the USSR made systematic, calculated moves to erase the McCloy-Zorin Accords even from public memory.

Similarly, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was effectively derailed and considerably weakened after subversive forces successfully pitted NAM members against each other or engineered regime changes. Although NAM stands in disarray, how it evolved is a testimony to the potential it still has to steer international relations. If and when concerned people of the world demand concerted action based on the Agreed Principles, NAM—by playing a crucial role in advancing the cause of disarmament and peace—can still become a powerful force to challenge the interests of the military-industrial complex that dominates the world.

The tenets of NAM evolved over a long period. One of the prime movers behind its evolution was undoubtedly Jawaharlal Nehru, who later became the first Prime Minister of India. Nehru was in Europe for nearly two years during 1925-’27 and had the opportunity to interact with several European political workers and movements and other Asian, African and Latin American nationalists then living in exile or visiting Europe. He was not just a participant on behalf of the Indian National Congress at the first International Congress Against Colonial Oppression and Imperialism held in Brussels from 10 to 14 February 1927. He was also one of its principal organizers. The conference was attended by 174 delegates representing 134 organizations from 37 countries—mainly from Asia, Africa and Latin America. Several well-known personalities of the period like Clara Zetkin, Romain Rolland, Maxim Gorky, MK Gandhi, Upton Sinclair, Albert Einstein, Madame Sun Yat-Sen, Ernst Toller and others had also sent messages of support. It was when the League Against Imperialism and for National Independence was formed at the culmination of the conference—with Nehru one of the members of its executive committee—that organized opposition to colonialism and imperialism began in a concerted way.

Nehru’s thoughts were firmly moulded by the deliberations at the 1927 Congress, where he interacted with JT Gumede (then president of the African National Congress, South Africa), Mohammed Hatta (later the Vice-President of Indonesia), Liau Hansin (CEC member, Kuomintang, China), Messali Hadj (Algerian nationalist), Henri Barbusse (French writer), Fenner Brockeway (British anti-colonial activist) and a host of others. By taking the initiative to express solidarity with other anti-colonial and anti-imperialist movements, while being at the forefront of the Indian national movement, Nehru gradually became a prominent Indian statesman with international stature.

The major foreign policy decision that Nehru, as head of India’s interim government, made was his declaration that India would not join groups of states that were aligned against each other but would strive to establish friendly relations with all countries. During a radio address on 7 September 1946, Nehru said,

“We propose, as far as possible, to keep away from the power politics of groups aligned against one another, which have led in the past to world wars and which may again lead to disasters on an even vaster scale…The world, in spite of its inner rivalries and hatreds and inner conflict, moves inevitably towards closer cooperation and the building up of a world commonwealth. It is for this One World that free India will work, a world in which there is the free cooperation of free peoples, and no class or group exploits another.”

In all probability, Nehru must have been trying to repair the damage caused by Winston Churchill’s confrontational rhetoric on 5 March 1946 at Fulton, Missouri, USA, after Churchill had lost his premiership following the defeat of the Conservative Party in July 1945. Churchill’s speech sought to portray the world as divided between Western and Eastern spheres of influence, i.e., “Christian civilization” versus “Communism”, and he had emphasized the need for “settlement” of the threat posed by “communism” without further delay. In his provocative speech, Churchill said,

“…the Communist parties or fifth columns constitute a growing challenge and peril to Christian civilization… We should be most unwise not to face them squarely while time remains… Our difficulties and dangers will not be removed by closing our eyes to them. They will not be removed by mere waiting to see what happens; nor will they be removed by a policy of appeasement. What is needed is a settlement, and the longer this is delayed, the more difficult it will be and the greater our dangers will become.”

It is in this context that Nehru’s speech of 7 September 1946 gains added significance. Nehru opposed nations joining opposing camps and pitting themselves against one another.

Asian Relations Conference

To assist the evolution of a common foreign policy, the first Asian Relations Conference was held at a non-governmental level under the auspices of the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA) in Delhi from 23 March to 2 April 1947. Over 250 delegates from 28 countries attended it, including government representatives such as the then prime minister of Indonesia and prominent figures from some Asian republics of the former Soviet Union. Observers from the United Nations, the Arab League, and research institutions in Australia, Britain, USA and USSR also attended. The decision of all major Asian nations barring Japan, which was then under US occupation, to attend the conference was a heartening sign. It signalled their high regard for the firm anti-colonial and anti-imperialist stand of the Indian National Congress and the deep faith they reposed in India’s then interim government, formed on 2 September 1946.

On 23 March 1947, in his welcome address, “A United Asia for World Peace”, Nehru, as head of the interim government, underlined the main objective of the conference. He said,

“We have arrived at a stage in human affairs when the ideal of that One World and some kind of a world federation seems to be essential though there are many dangers and obstacles in the way. We should work for that ideal and not any grouping which comes in the way of this larger world group.”

Fully concurring with Nehru, Mahatma Gandhi, in his address during the closing plenary of the conference on 2 April 1947, said,

“Of course, I believe in One World. And how can I possibly do otherwise… The West today is in despair of multiplication of atom bombs, because a multiplication of atom bombs means utter destruction, not merely of the West, but it will be a destruction of the world… It is up to you to deliver the whole world, not merely Asia but deliver the whole world, from that wickedness, from that sin.”

That is the ideal the Asian Relations Conference tried to convey to the world through its participants—the oneness of humanity and the need to end all war. It is, therefore, very apparent that the Partition of India that the British Administration had engineered intended to wreck that ideal.

Conference on Indonesia

The non-aligned and internationalist character of independent India’s foreign policy was first demonstrated when the International Conference on Indonesia was convened in Delhi from 20 to 23 January 1949. Indonesia was under the occupation of the Dutch for nearly 118 years before Japan occupied it in 1942. Indonesia attained independence on 17 August 1945, with the surrender of Japan at the end of WW II. However, Holland’s attempt to restore the colonial rule in Indonesia by armed force on the night of 19 December 1948 sent alarm signals across the newly-decolonized countries about the possible threat of recolonization. Jogjakarta, the Indonesian capital, was seized by Dutch paratroopers and president Sukarno, prime minister Mohammed Hatta, and other members of the Indonesian government were arrested and confined on an isolated island.

Nehru sharply denounced Holland’s action and described it as naked and brazen aggression. He decided to close all Indian seaports and airports to Dutch vessels and aircraft. It is in response to Burmese prime minister U Nu’s proposal that Nehru decided to organize an international conference. Nineteen countries, including Australia and New Zealand, attended it. The Delhi Conference condemned the Dutch aggression and demanded immediate release of the arrested members of the Indonesian government, withdrawal of Dutch troops from Jogjakarta and transfer of power to the United States of Indonesia by 1 January 1950.

Consequently, hostilities ended on 7 May 1949, after India transmitted the Conference Resolution to the UN Security Council on 24 January, followed by Security Council intervention on 28 January 1949. An agreement was signed to hold further negotiations at a round table conference under the auspices of the United Nations to end Dutch colonialism in Indonesia formally. The Conference on Indonesia clearly demonstrated India’s stature as an able mediator in settling international disputes.

One development that had a significant bearing on shaping a non-aligned policy was Nehru’s visit to the United States in October 1949. The US administration timed the visit to coincide with the ascendancy of the Communist Party to power in China. According to Prof HW Brands of the University of Texas at Austin, US,

“With the communist victory in China, Americans began to look on India with new eyes. In October 1949, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru visited the United States… Every major newspaper devoted editorials to the significance of Nehru’s visit; news-magazines and informed journals held forth on the enlarged role that India must now play in the world. Nehru arrived in the United States only days after the official proclamation of the People’s Republic of China; through nearly all the American commentary ran a single theme—China had fallen, India must not fall… The purpose of increasing the Western orientation of South Asia was to strengthen India and Pakistan against communism….”

During the visit, the US establishment exerted considerable pressure on Nehru to desist from recognizing the People’s Republic of China and draw India into the anti-communist camp. However, Nehru spurned all US attempts to entangle India in a military alliance in return for the economic aid that Nehru had gone to seek. Nehru opted to return home empty-handed, without American assistance, rather than let India become a camp follower of the US establishment. Prof. Dennis Merrill, professor of history at the University of Missouri, US, recounted the outcome of that India-US meeting as follows,

“When American officials concluded that India counted for little in terms of US foreign policy, they denied that nation’s request for economic aid.”

Only after India began receiving rice from China through barter trade was the US compelled to sell wheat to India. A page-six headline published on 2 January 1951 in The New York Times said, China to Sell India Rice; To Ship 50,000 Tons of Grain in Barter Deal for Jute appears to have completely rattled the US administration. Six weeks after this news emerged, the US President on 12 February 1951 recommended to the US Congress to provide India with two million tons of grain on loan. Yet, it took another three months before the US President formally signed the India Emergency Food Aid Act, 1951, on 15 June 1951. Meanwhile, both China and the Soviet Union had offered to sell more food grains to India. Also, Nehru made it clear on 1 May 1951 that “India, though grateful for help, would not accept food from any country if it had ‘any political strings attached’ to it”.

Positive Neutrality

Nehru was an ardent proponent of Positive Neutrality, which consisted of non-participation in military blocs combined with active moves against the conclusion of military alliances and promoting the cause of disarmament. It also entailed mediation in settlement of international disputes to ease international tensions. It meant firm opposition to colonialism and lending active support to all peoples fighting for independence. Integral to it was the struggle against apartheid and racialism expressed in the demand for complete equality of races and the banning of discrimination against any people. Positive neutrality manifested itself, above all, in the active campaign to preserve and strengthen world peace.

India and the Korean War

India was extremely concerned about the outbreak of violent hostilities between North and South Korea on 25 June 1950. After the US and its allies (masked as “UN forces”) entered the war on the side of South Korea on 13 July 1950, Nehru sent messages to the Soviet Union and the US stating that India aimed to “localize the conflict and assist the speedy, peaceful settlement”. Nehru suggested that the US, the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China, with the assistance of other states, “…find a basis for cessation of the conflict for a final solution of the Korean problem”. [Ref: Yuri Nasenko, “Jawaharlal Nehru and India’s Foreign Policy”, Sterling Publishers, 1977 p.106.] While the Soviet Union welcomed the proposal, the United States rejected it.

Concurrently, as news of American war crimes in North Korea due to widespread aerial bombings began to appear, protest movements in India against the US intervention grew, which even The New York Times could not help noticing. According to an NYT report,

“Anti-United States feeling in India never has been so widespread as it is now. With every day of the Korean war bringing more news of bombed cities and flaming villages, the unpopularity of the United States is growing.”

After North Korean forces were pushed back from South Korea, it became evident that the “UN forces” were preparing to invade North Korea. The PRC informed India through the Indian Ambassador in China that it would be forced to enter the war if the “UN forces” cross the 38th parallel. To prevent escalation of the war, Nehru called a press conference on 30 September 1950 and fervently pleaded the “UN forces” not cross the 38th parallel. But the United States chose to ignore Nehru’s advice and invaded North Korea on 1 October 1950. As a result, China entered the war on the side of North Korea on 19 October 1950.

By late November 1950, Chinese and North Korean forces pushed the “UN forces” beyond the 38th parallel. Then in desperation, President Harry Truman even made veiled threats of using nuclear weapons against North Korea. After that, a series of attacks and counter-attacks took place until 11 April 1951, when General MacArthur, intent on escalating the war, was replaced as commander of the “UN forces” at the instance of US allies for insubordination. From then on until July 1953, other than a few sporadic violent incidents, the fighting practically stalled around the 38th parallel.

During 1951-1952, several attempts were made to arrive at a negotiated settlement. However, differences over the modalities to exchange prisoners of war persisted. On 17 November 1952, India proposed a neutral nations’ commission to resolve the issue, which the UN General Assembly accepted on 3 December 1952. It took seven more months before all concerned parties were brought on board to sign the truce in Korea on 27 July 1953. India was asked to head the neutral nation’s commission on repatriation of the prisoners of war and to provide security forces during the prisoners’ exchange.

Thus, according to historian Yuri Nasenko, a former professor of history, Patrice Lumumba People’s Friendship University, Moscow, “India deserves much credit for its efforts to secure a peaceful settlement in Korea and recognition of the fact that the Indian draft resolution formed the basis of the agreement on the prisoners of war which made it possible to lead the talks on Korea out of an impasse.”

‘Standstill Agreement’

Nehru was deeply perturbed by the series of atmospheric and underwater nuclear weapon tests being conducted by the then three nuclear-weapon states, namely, the US, USSR, and UK. Alarmed by the reported grievous impact of the atmospheric test of a hydrogen bomb conducted by the US over the Pacific Islands on 1 March 1954, Nehru expressed serious concerns in the Indian Parliament on 2 April 1954.

He said, 

“A new weapon of unprecedented power, both in volume and intensity, with unascertained, and probably unascertainable, range of destructive potential in respect of time and space, that is both as regards duration and extent of its consequences, is being tested, unleashing its massive power, for use as a weapon of war… We are told that there is no effective protection against the hydrogen bomb and that millions of people may be exterminated by a single explosion… These are horrible prospects, and it affects us, nations and peoples everywhere whether we are involved in wars or power blocs or not… [Hu]mankind has to awaken itself to the reality and face the situation with determination and assert itself to avert calamity… Pending progress towards some solution, full or partial, in respect of the prohibition and elimination of these weapons of mass destruction… the Government [of India] would consider, among steps to be taken now and forthwith, the following:

Some sort of, what may be called, ‘Standstill Agreement’ in respect, at least of these actual explosions, even if arrangements about the discontinuance of production and stockpiling must wait more substantial arrangements amongst those principally concerned….”

From Nehru’s point of view, disarmament in general and the elimination of nuclear weapons in particular, were integral to the doctrine of non-alignment.

After the ceasefire agreement came into force in Korea on 27 July 1953, the United States shifted its attention to Indo-China to prevent the defeat of France in its colonial war of over seven years. On 18 May 1953, United States Secretary of State John Dulles had already expressed alarm. He said, 

“…all of Southeast Asia is today in great peril, and if Indo-China is lost, there would be a chain reaction throughout the Far East [and South Asia].”

While the United States was doing everything to prop up France by meeting reportedly over 76% of the expenses incurred by France to wage the Indo-China War, during a debate in Parliament on 22 February 1954, Nehru appealed for an immediate ceasefire. On 24 April 1954, just two days before the Geneva Conference opened for all interested parties to discuss peaceful settlement of the Korean and Indo-China issues, Nehru proposed a six-point programme in Parliament to establish peace in Indo-China.

Apart from seeking an immediate ceasefire, it urged France to grant the countries of Indo-China independence and an undertaking from the great powers not to interfere in their affairs. His proposals formed the basis of the communiqué of the Conference of Prime Ministers of five countries—Burma [now Myanmar], Ceylon [now Sri Lanka], India, Indonesia and Pakistan—which convened on 29 April-2 May 1954 in Colombo. The communiqué came to the notice of the members of the Geneva Conference. [At the Colombo Conference, Indonesia proposed an Afro-Asian Conference in 1955; Yuri Nasenko (1977), p.174.]

India was not an official participant at the Geneva Conference, but VK Krishna Menon was sent as an Indian representative. He held unofficial meetings with heads of the official delegations present, which significantly contributed to the success of the talks. Moreover, the humiliating defeat of the French forces at the hands of the Viet Minh forces in the battle of Dien Bien Phu on 7 May 1954 ensured the Geneva Accords on Indo-China were speedily signed on 21 July 1954. To supervise the fulfilment of the terms of the Accords, an International Commission was appointed consisting of Canada, Poland and India with India as chair, which again was a sign of international recognition of India’s stature as an honest mediator.

Panchsheel Agreement

Late in June 1954, during a recess in the Geneva Conference, at the initiative of Krishna Menon, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai was invited to India. The talks between Zhou Enlai and Nehru ended on 28 June 1954 with a joint statement underlining the principles that would define relations between India and China. The Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence were first set out in the preamble to the Sino-Indian Treaty on Trade and Communications between the Tibetan areas and India. It was signed on 29 April 1954 at Peking [Beijing] by the Indian Ambassador to China N Raghavan and the Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Chang Han-fu. Also known as the Panchsheel Principles, they were:

1. Mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty.

2. Non-aggression.

3. Non-interference in each other’s internal affairs.

4. Equality and mutual benefit.

5. Peaceful coexistence.

The joint statement signed 28 June 1954 said,

“The Prime Ministers reaffirmed these principles and felt that they should be applied in their relations with other countries in Asia as well as in other parts of the world. If these principles are applied not only between various countries but also in international relations generally, they would form a solid foundation for peace and security and the fears and apprehensions that exist today would give place to a feeling of confidence…. With the assurance of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each country and of non-aggression, there would be peaceful coexistence and friendly relations between the countries concerned. This would lessen the tensions that exist in the world today and help in creating a climate of peace.”

The United States administration, of course, had no intention to uphold such principles.

Menace of Military Blocs

In a desperate attempt to get a foothold in South Asia, the United States tried to bolster its relationship with Pakistan by first granting it military aid. India was informed of the decision on 24 February 1954 through a letter from the United States President Dwight Eisenhower. The letter said that should the Indian government request such military aid; it would receive the “most sympathetic consideration”. Nehru categorically rejected the offer of United States military aid during his address before the Indian Parliament on 1 March 1954. [Yuri Nasenko, p.166]. Unperturbed by Nehru’s adverse reaction, on the very day the Geneva Accords on Indo-China were signed, Eisenhower held a press conference to make the United States’ aggressive intentions clear: “The United States is actively pursuing discussions with other free nations with a view to the rapid organization of a collective defense in Southeast Asia to prevent further direct or indirect Communist aggression in that general area.”

With this objective, the United States first entered into a mutual defence assistance agreement with Pakistan on 19 May 1954. After that, it attempted to draw the “Colombo Powers” into the proposed Southeast Asian military alliance, which was to be formed following a conference scheduled in the Philippines from 6 September 1954 onwards. Nehru not only rejected the American invitation, he told Parliament the proposed conference was an attempt “to change the whole trend towards peace that the Geneva Conference had created…”.

Burma, Ceylon and Indonesia, too, rejected the invitation. Only three Asian countries, Pakistan, the Philippines and Thailand, joined the USA, United Kingdom, France, Australia and New Zealand to form the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), formed in Manila on 8 September 1954. The United States also signed Mutual Defense Treaties with South Korea on 1 October 1953 and with the Chiang Kai-shek government on 2 December 1954.

Yet another military alliance, initially known as the Baghdad Pact and later known as Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), was formed by Iraq and Turkey on 24 February 1955. In the same year, the United Kingdom on 5 April, Pakistan on 23 September, and Iran on 3 November joined the Baghdad Pact.

Concurrently, covert activities went on as usual. While preparations were underway to hold the Bandung Conference, CIA agents allegedly attempted to disrupt it with a plot to assassinate Enlai while he was en route to Indonesia. Air India plane “Kashmir Princess”, which China had hired to transport delegates (reportedly including Enlai) to Bandung, took off from Hong Kong and was blown up mid-air over the sea near Indonesia on 11 April 1955, killing all but three of the 19 passengers and crew.

Enlai miraculously escaped due to routine security precautions by changing, at the last moment, to another flight from Rangoon to Bandung with Nehru and Burmese Premier U Nu. [See Col AK Mitra, “Disaster in the Air: The Crash of the Kashmir Princess, 1955”, 2001.]

Bandung Conference

The tenets of NAM were first fully enunciated at the Asian-African Conference at Bandung, Indonesia, which was held from 18 to 24 April 1955. Altogether about 340 delegates from 29 countries representing over 1,440 million people, almost two-thirds of the world population, attended. Reportedly, around 655 correspondents from across the globe also landed in Bandung to cover the Conference.

In addition to demands to end apartheid and colonialism, Section G of the Final Communiqué on “Promotion of World Peace and Cooperation” precisely expressed the Bandung Conference’s central aim. It was as follows:

“The Conference considered that disarmament and the prohibition of the production, experimentation and use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons of war imperative to save [hu]mankind and civilisation from the fear and prospect of wholesale destruction. It considered that the nations of Asia and Africa assembled here have a duty towards humanity and civilization to proclaim their support for disarmament and for the prohibition of these weapons and to appeal to nations principally concerned and to world opinion, to bring about such disarmament and prohibition… The conference declared universal disarmament is an absolute necessity for the preservation of peace and requested the United Nations to continue its efforts and appealed to all concerned speedily to bring about the regulation, limitation, control and reduction of all armed forces and armaments, including the prohibition of the production, experimentation and use of all weapons of mass destruction, and to establish effective international control to this end.”

The Final Communiqué also implored the participating nations to remain free from mistrust and fear, show goodwill, practice tolerance, live together in peace with one another as good neighbors, and develop friendly cooperation based on ten agreed principles.

Enduring unity and cooperation among the Asian and African nations based on the above objects and principles would have harmed the interests of the militarist blocs. Hence, the proponents of military blocs did everything they could to disrupt the possibility of any such unity and cooperation among the Afro-Asian nations. The failure of the Bandung Conference to launch a permanent Asian-African nations’ organization was a sign that the writ of the pro-militarist lobby within the Asian and African countries had ultimately prevailed.

Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)

The untiring efforts of Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, Indonesian President Sukarno, Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, and Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah, salvaged the objects and purpose of the Bandung Conference in 1961. That year, 25 countries—eleven each from Asia and Africa and Yugoslavia, Cuba, and Cyprus—formed the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).

A preliminary meeting was held in the Yugoslav Mission at the United Nations on 29 September 1960, when the five leaders were in New York to attend the 15th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. They presented a Draft Resolution to the General Assembly on the same day. As an urgent first step, it requested that the United States President and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR renew their recently interrupted contacts “so that their declared willingness to find solutions of the outstanding problems by negotiation may be progressively implemented”.

Belgrade Conference

Subsequently, the First Conference of Heads of State or Government of non-aligned countries was held in Belgrade from 1 to 6 September 1961. Since the Belgrade Conference was during the peak of the United States-USSR Cold War, its primary focus was on disarmament and peace. After deliberations, each of the 25 heads of state or government in Belgrade decided to sign identical letters on 5 September 1961, addressed to President Kennedy and Premier Nikita Khrushchev, urging the United States and the USSR to hold disarmament talks forthwith. This unique letter said,

“…we take the liberty of urging the Great Powers concerned that negotiations should be resumed and pursued so that the danger of war might be removed from the world and mankind adopts ways of peace…. We feel convinced that devoted as both of you are to world peace, your efforts through persistent negotiations will lead to a way out of the present impasse and enable the world and humanity to work and live for prosperity and peace.”

In addition, the Belgrade Conference outlined the contours of a desirable agreement on general and complete disarmament. The Belgrade Declaration issued on 6 September 1961 explicitly stated:

“The participants …consider that disarmament is an imperative need and most urgent task of mankind. A radical solution to this problem, which has become an urgent necessity in the present state of armaments, in the unanimous view of participating countries, can be achieved only by means of a general, complete and strictly internationally controlled disarmament… general and complete disarmament should include the elimination of armed forces, armaments, foreign bases, manufacture of arms as well as the elimination of institutions and installations for military training, except for purposes of internal security; and the total prohibition of production, possession and utilization of nuclear, and thermo-nuclear arms, bacteriological and chemical weapons as well as the elimination of equipment and installations for the delivery and placement and operational use of weapons of mass destruction on national territories…. The participants in the conference urge the Great Powers to sign without further delay a treaty for general and complete disarmament in order to save mankind from the scourge of war and to release energy and resources now being spent on armaments to be used for the peaceful economic and social development of all mankind.”

The appeal and Belgrade Declaration were personally handed to Premier Khrushchev by Prime Minister Nehru and President Nkrumah on 7 September 1961 and to President Kennedy by President Sukarno and President Modibo Keita (of Mali) on 12 September. It had an immediate and far-reaching impact. President Kennedy wrote to presidents Sukarno and Keita on 13 September, saying,

“…we found elements in the message and in the Declaration which reflected a genuine desire to bring about a relaxation of tensions and which, if applied in a truly neutral and objective manner, could be of positive benefit in easing world tensions.”

The pressure exerted by the five non-aligned nations, and as per the commitments made before the First Committee of the UN General Assembly on 30 March 1961, the US and the USSR began bilateral negotiations to formulate Agreed Principles to pursue disarmament negotiations. While the first two rounds of negotiations held in Washington (16-30 June 1961) and Moscow (1-16 July 1961) were not very fruitful, the third round, held in New York (6-19 September 1961) with valuable inputs from NAM’s Belgrade Declaration of 6 September 1961—was very successful.

John McCloy (chairperson, General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament in the US government) and Valerian Zorin (Deputy Foreign Minister, USSR) were the principal negotiators who drafted the “Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations”. The agreement later became known as the McCloy-Zorin Accords on General and Complete disarmament. It was signed between the United States and the USSR in New York on 20 September 1961 and submitted to the General Assembly.

The McCloy-Zorin Accords stated that the United States and the USSR have agreed to recommend certain principles as the basis for future multilateral negotiations on disarmament. According to these principles, they also decided to call upon other states to reach an early agreement on disarmament.

1. The goal of negotiations is to achieve agreement on a program that will ensure: (a) disarmament is general and complete and war is no longer an instrument for settling international problems;
2. The program for general and complete disarmament shall ensure that States will have at their disposal only those non-nuclear armaments, forces, facilities, and establishments as are agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens;
3. The program for general and complete disarmament shall ensure that States will have at their disposal only those non-nuclear armaments, forces, facilities, and establishments as are agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens;
4. The program for general and complete disarmament shall contain the necessary provisions, concerning the military establishment of every nation, for:

(a) Disbanding of armed forces, dismantling of military establishments, including bases, cessation of the production of armaments as well as their liquidation or conversion to peaceful uses;

(b) Elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological, and other weapons of mass destruction and cessation of the production of such weapons;

(c) Elimination of all means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction;

(d) Abolishment of the organization and institutions designed to organize the military effort of States, cessation of military training, and closing of all military training institutions;

(e) Discontinuance of military expenditures….”

As is evident, the Agreed Principles propounded in the McCloy-Zorin Accords were very radical ones with far-reaching implications. Five days after they were submitted to the UNGA, President Kennedy, highlighting the need for general and complete disarmament, noted the stand of the non-aligned nations. In his address to the UNGA on 25 September 1961 titled “Program for General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World”, he said: “Mankind must put an end to war—or war will put an end to mankind.… Let us call a truce to terror. Let us invoke the blessings of peace. And as we build an international capacity to keep the peace, let us join in dismantling the national capacity to wage war… The risks inherent in disarmament pale in comparison to the risks inherent in an unlimited arms race. It is in this spirit that the recent Belgrade Conference—recognizing that this is no longer a Soviet problem or an American problem, but a human problem—endorsed a program of “general, complete and strictly an internationally controlled disarmament…. And it is in this spirit that we have presented with the agreement of the Soviet Union—under the label, both nations now accept of “general and complete disarmament”—a new statement of newly-agreed principles for negotiation.”

On 20 December 1961, the UNGA Resolution No.1722 (XVI) unanimously adopted the McCloy-Zorin Accords and set up an Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENCD). The ENCD included five representatives each from the NATO and Warsaw Pact blocs and eight representatives from the non-aligned nations, including India, to frame concrete proposals to realise the goal of disarmament. It is, therefore, evident that NAM had played a significant role in advancing the cause of peace and disarmament.

Military Industrial Complex

The most considerable opposition to disarmament, obviously, came from the armaments lobby, which was especially powerful in the United States. According to the ‘Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists’ (February 1983, p.35), “The anti-disarmament pressures on the President that summer were enormous. They were primarily economic and, derivatively, political.”

Citing a book by Arthur Dean, a member of John McCloy’s negotiating team, titled “Test Ban and Disarmament: The Path of Negotiation,” 1966, author Marcus Raskin, a member of the United States delegation to the 18-nation disarmament conference in Geneva in 1962, added,

“…protests came from politically powerful representatives of the states with defense industries, especially California and Texas, who feared any disarmament measures might have a deleterious effect on the economies of their states.”

The observations of Raskin and Dean were ominous considering the tragic fate that soon befell President Kennedy. 1961 culminated with the hope to make concrete progress towards disarmament, but sixty years later, that fervent hope lies severely dented. The systematic attacks by the powers that be on NAM—from instigating the Sino-Indian War in 1962 to engineering regime changes in Indonesia (1965), Ghana (1966), Mali (1968); Egypt (1970), Chile (1973); Bangladesh (1975); Burkina Faso (1987); Yugoslavia (1990) and elsewhere—and the calculated assassinations of President Kennedy in 1963; Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1984; Prime Minister Olof Palme in 1986; and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 caused a severe setback to the cause of peace and disarmament. The machinations of the military-industrial complex to sideline peace and disarmament pose a grave threat to humanity.

Originally published as a four-part series by ND Jayaprakash at Newsclick.in as follows:

How NAM Changed International Relations: Part 1

NAM and Nehru’s Principled Stand: Part 2

NAM and India’s Attempts to Nurture Asian-African Ties: Part 3

How Military-Industrial Complex Sidelined Peace and Disarmament: Part 4.

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